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Introduction
In April 2013, Germany's largest state Bavaria experienced a new political scandal of favoritism. Members of the Bavarian parliament (Landtag) had hired relatives as office employees who were paid by the Bavarian parliament ("nepotism"). The scandal became public because the expert in German parliamentary affairs Hans Herbert von Arnim published a book elaborating on how Bavarian politicians benefit from being in office (Arnim 2013). In 2000, the Bavarian parliament tightened the state law. Members of parliament (MPs) were no longer allowed to hire spouses, children, or parents as office employees. 1 An interim arrangement made it possible to employ relatives that had already assisted the MPs prior to the tightening of the law. However, as long as 13 years after the interim arrangement was introduced, some MPs still employed close relatives. Employing these relatives did (probably) not break the law, 2 but certainly smacked of exploiting taxpayers' money. 3 The state elections in Bavaria on 15 September 2013 and the German federal elections on 22 September 2013 attached a great deal of importance to this scandal. Politicians involved in the scandal realized the political hazard: some politicians who had hired relatives repaid the relatives' salaries immediately or donated the amounts. Some MPs considered hiring relatives as legitimate in earlier times, but acknowledged that nowadays MPs should not hire relatives.
Although three parties were involved in the scandal, it is conceivable that the reigning conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) incurred the largest loss of votes. About 70% of the involved politicians are CSU members. Survey evidence suggests that voters largely 1 The law still allowed for employing relatives other than spouses, children, and parents. In May 2013 the Bavarian parliament also decided to prohibit employing these relatives as of June 2013. On changes of the Bavarian law see, for example, Oberreuter (2014) . In Italy, public sector employees were shown to favor their children and support their access to public sector positions (Scoppa 2009 ). In the Philippines, relatives of elected MP candidates were more likely to take up office in the future than relatives of MP candidates that were not elected (Querubin 2013) . 2 The Bavarian supreme board of audit arrived at the conclusion that employing relatives did already break the law since a change in the law in 2004. 3 Voters may well punish politicians for activities which are in line with the law but are not in line with voters' moral beliefs. Politicians' outside income is another case in point (see, for example, Arnold et al. 2014 and Couch et al. 1992 ).
considered the CSU to be most involved in scandals. 4 The opposition parties tried to exploit the scandal to increase their election prospects and replace the predominant CSU-led state government. On the predominant role of the CSU in Bavaria see, for example, Hanns-SeidelStiftung (1995) , Mintzel (1998) , Oberreuter (2011) , and Zolleis and Wertheimer (2013) .
The family scandal in Bavaria was a hot issue in the German media for many weeks. The seminal papers of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) suggest that retrospective voters hold politicians responsible for misbehavior in office. In particular, voters often punish politicians involved in political scandals (see section 2). Did Bavarian voters punish rentseeking politicians? We examine how the scandal influenced the outcome and voter turnout of Gauweiler resigned on 23 February 1994 because he was inculpated to have illegally leased his law office (Kanzlei-Affäre). Eduard Zwick, a prominent CSU-campaigning contributor, was inculpated to be involved in tax evasion (Zwick-Affäre).
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In the summer and fall 1994, elections to the European parliament, the Bavarian state parliament, and the German national parliament took place. In spring 1994, polls predicted that the CSU would lose votes and receive less than 50% of votes. The CSU, however, succeeded in the 1994 elections. The expert Alf Mintzel concluded that the predominant CSU may only put herself in jeopardy and that the CSU made a brilliant coup by purifying intraparty misconduct in 1993/1994 (Mintzel 1998: 164) .
Because voters often punish politicians involved in political scandals, but Bavarian voters did not seem to have punished Bavarian politicians over many decades, examining electoral consequences of the 2013 family scandal in Bavaria is a worthwhile endeavor. The results do not show that being involved in the scandal influenced the outcome and voter turnout of the state elections.
Related studies on political scandals
Political scandals often have far-reaching consequences. Scandals influence, for example, politicians' election prospects. When an incumbent is discredited, an issue is whether the incumbent will be re-elected. In a similar vein, challengers may not even have the chance of getting elected. Severe scandals bring individual political careers to an end.
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Political scandals have various facets: financial scandals include tax evasion, moral scandals include sexual misconduct.
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Prominent examples of sexual misconduct are 8 On political scandals and the CSU reinforcement in 1994, see Mintzel (1998: 109f., 164) . 9 In Japan, "the standard way of dealing with a scandal was to resign from the party and official posts but run again in the next elections" (Nyblade and Reed 2008: 930) . 10 Politicians either act corruptly for material gain or for electoral gain (Nyblade and Reed 2008 
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Scandals involving the incumbent were also shown to have reduced trust in local politicians (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2014). In Japan, candidates were shown to have lost 1.34% of votes in the 1990 election because of scandals. In Great Britain, meanwhile, candidates were shown to have lost 1.14% of votes in the 1997 election due to scandals (Reed 1999) . In the 2004 Brazilian municipal elections, the incumbents' re-election probability decreased by 7 percentage points when at least two cases of corruption were reported as compared to unaudited incumbents (Ferraz and Finan 2008) . In the 2009 UK expenses 11 Doherty et al. (2011) examine scandalous behavior and the responsibilities of the official in question. 12 Puglisi and Snyder (2011) examine how newspapers' ideology influences media coverage of scandals in the United States. Bowler and Karp (2004) discuss how scandals influence the regard for political institutions. On corruption and press regulation, see Gratton (in press).
scandal, press coverage reduced the vote shares of MPs involved in the scandal, but did not decrease the MPs' probability of re-election. Voters were shown to have punished MPs and not the MPs' parties (Larcinese and Sircar 2012) . Politicians were punished more by voters when voters expressed no clear preference for a specific party (Eggers in press). When corruption rents were available in a jurisdiction, politicians were more likely to increase their campaigning efforts in order to capitalize on the benefits of holding office. Campaigning effort may well give rise to high voter turnout.
The effects of political scandals on voters' behavior differ, because some scandals are more severe than other scandals. How an individual political scandal influences election outcome and voter turnout thus remains as an undetermined empirical question.
Institutional background

The Bavarian political party landscape
The conservative CSU has dominated politics in Bavaria for decades. 
Bavarian state elections
In Bavarian state elections voters cast two votes in a personalized proportional representation system. The first vote determines which candidate is to obtain the direct mandate in one of the 90 electoral districts with a relative majority. With the second vote, voters select a politician on a regional party list. Each party that received at least 5% of the first and second votes obtains a number of the 180 seats in the parliament that corresponds to the party's first and second vote share. Candidates voted into the parliament with the first vote (direct mandate) obtain their seats first. Candidates from the regional party lists obtain the remaining seats.
When the number of direct mandates exceeds the party's vote share in a region, the party obtains excess mandates, and the other parties obtain equalizing mandates.
Empirical analysis
MPs hiring relatives
The Bavarian president of parliament, Barbara Stamm, published a list including those MPs MPs hired relatives despite the fact that or because they knew that hiring relatives was going to be forbidden. To be sure, some MPs also hired relatives other than spouses, children, or parents. Hiring relatives other than spouses, children, or parents did not violate the law. We, however, do not include relatives other than spouses, children, or parents in the baseline model because the MPs who hired them did not appear on the Stamm list; but these politicians were also criticized in the public debate and we refer to them in the section on robustness tests. Figure 2 shows the shares of the parties' MPs that employed relatives. The share of CSU MPs that hired relatives (44%) is higher than the share of SPD MPs that hired relatives (29%). The share of the Green MPs that hired relatives is substantially smaller (8%). The FDP and the Free Voters did not employ relatives. A t-test on means shows that there is a significant difference between CSU and SPD politicians in hiring relatives. We reject the hypothesis of no difference between CSU and SPD politicians with a t-value of 1.98.
Vote shares and voter turnout
The conservative CSU won the state elections on 15 September 2013 and received with 56% the absolute majority of seats in parliament (48% of the total votes). As in the 2008 election, the CSU won all districts except one in the 2013 election. We examine how the scandal We directly investigate how the scandal influenced a politician's re-election when the individual politician ran for office again after she/he experienced the scandal. We compare the first vote share of CSU politicians affected by the scandal and CSU politicians not affected by the scandal in 2008 and 2013 for candidates that ran in both elections.
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In cases where the scandal brought a politician's career to an end, or a politician would have ended her/his career in any event -the scandal notwithstanding -we cannot compare the individual vote of the elections in 2008 and 2013. We thus also compare the total vote share (sum of first and second votes) of the CSU in districts affected by the scandal with the total vote share of the CSU in districts not affected by the scandal, independent of the party's candidate. It is conceivable that the scandal also influenced voter turnout as a result of disenchantment with politics. We therefore examine how the scandal influenced voter turnout by comparing the 16 Excluding the two districts in which the candidates were nominated after the scandal leaked out does not change the inferences. 17 In districts that were not adjusted between the 2008 and the 2013 state elections, 50% of the MPs who hired relatives and 63% of the MPs who did not hire relatives stood for re-election. A t-test on means shows that there is no significant difference between MPs who hired relatives and MPs who did not hire relatives in the decision to stand for re-election. We do not reject the null hypothesis of no difference between MPs who hired relatives and MPs who did not hire relatives with a t-value of 0.94. 
Descriptive statistics
We use data from the Centre of Bavarian History, the Bavarian Statistical Office, the Bavarian parliament, and MPs' personal websites. We only include those (73 out of 91) districts that were not adjusted between the 2008 and the 2013 state elections. Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics. The samples include 88 and 146 observations. Figure 4 shows the first vote share of the CSU in the state elections 2008 and 2013, for districts that were and were not affected by the scandal. The CSU first vote share increased from 45% to 49% in scandal districts and from 43% to 47% in other districts. A t-test on means shows that there is no significant difference between scandal districts and other districts in the CSU first vote share change. We do not reject the null hypothesis of no difference between scandal districts and other districts with a t-value of 0.44. Figure 5 shows the total vote share of the CSU in the state elections 2008 and 2013, for districts being and not being affected by the scandal. The CSU total vote share increased from 47% to 50% in scandal districts and from 44% to 48% in other districts. There is no significant difference between scandal districts and other districts in the CSU total vote share change. Figure 6 shows the voter turnout in the state elections 2008 and 2013, for districts that were and were not affected by the scandal. The voter turnout increased from 58% to 63% in scandal districts and from 58% to 64% in other districts. 
Empirical strategy
The difference-in-differences model takes the following form: 
18
The dummy variable City i assumes the value one if an independent city was located in the electoral district. Region il describes dummy variables for the regions where the individual candidates were elected (reference category: Oberbayern), and u it describes an error term. We estimate a difference-in-differences model with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (Huber/White/sandwich standard errors -see Huber 1967 and White 1980).
Regression results
The results in Tables 3 and 4 voters were shown to punish politicians involved in scandals (see section 2). We provide explanations for this result in the conclusion. The results also do not indicate a scandal district specific effect (Hired relative) or that the CSU first vote share was higher or lower in 2013.
The age and gender of the MP or MP candidate, whether the MP or MP candidate is a minister or the incumbent, and the unemployment rate do not turn out to be statistically significant. 
Robustness tests
We tested whether the results change when we use the difference between the 2013 and the 2008 CSU first or total vote share or voter turnout as a dependent variable. Replicating Tables   3 to 5 , the results do not show that the scandal influenced the change in the CSU first and total vote share and the voter turnout.
We used the CSU second vote share as dependent variable. Replicating Table 4 To be sure, all scandal MPs from the regional party lists were also running as direct candidates -most of them in districts with a large CSU vote share. How these scandal MPs were sorted on regional party lists was thus not important, because they were going to be elected into parliament with the first vote in any event.
We replicated the regressions described in Tables 3 and 4 Considering also these MPs as being affected by the scandal does not change the inferences.
We tested whether the scandal influenced the CSU first vote share when we include also districts in which the MP candidate has changed from 2008 to 2013. We also tested whether the scandal influenced the CSU total vote share and the voter turnout when we include only districts in which the MP candidate has not changed from 2008 to 2013.
Replicating Tables 3 to 5 , the results do not show that the scandal influenced the CSU first and total vote share and the voter turnout.
Conclusion
The family scandal in Bavaria 2013 was a hot issue in the German media for many weeks. Another issue is that the CSU/FDP government helped citizens affected by the flood to reconstruct their houses etc. To be sure, the flooding may have an effect in the districts that were affected by the natural disaster and also generated spill-over effects to others. That is to say that a good performance of a politician in a flooding district may have helped CSU politicians of other districts. If those politicians having enjoyed positive spill-over effects are the ones who were involved in the scandal, the flooding effect may have compensated for their personal failure. 22 Schoen (2007 Schoen ( , 2008 examines how federal politics influence Bavarian state elections. Falkenhagen (2013) describes the CSU to be an ethno-regional party: "A regional party is rooted in its territory and may promote decentralization as a tool to increase efficiency and general responsiveness of government or as a strengthening of institutional checks and balances as well as identity-driven reasons. An ethno-regional party has the same agenda but its reasons would not be rooted in the territory but in the explicit distinctiveness of the people living there" (p. 399). 
